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Valorization Addendum
To a large extent, public policy choices strongly rely on traditional economic
assumptions of behavior, such as perfect rationality and narrow self-interest.
For example, reforms aiming at increasing competition (as in the railway, air-
line, electricity and gas industries) are often based on the conventional wisdom
that competition increases (consumer) welfare. This argument assumes that
contracts are complete, and that individuals’ preferences are exogenous to, and
therefore unaffected by, the institutional environment in which individuals make
their decisions. Yet, empirical studies have yielded mixed results on the impact
of pro-competition reforms on economic performance, and recent experiments
have reported on the deteriorating effects of competition on social orientation
and subjective well-being. This indicates that preferences and behavior are,
at least in part, shaped by the institutional arrangements in place, and casts
doubts on the solely positive effects of more competition. Given the impor-
tance of reciprocity as a driver of incomplete-contracts labor market outcomes,
shown both in the lab and (to some extent) in the field, potential consequences
of increased competition on workers’ (other-regarding) preferences should not
be ignored when designing competition policy reforms.
Chapters 3 and 4 provide controlled evidence on whether more competition
leads to higher welfare, while acknowledging the interaction effects between
product market, labor market and individuals’ (reciprocal) preferences. They
are intended to be an informative first step in the assessment of the effects
of output market competition for incomplete labor markets. We brought the
laboratory environment closer to real life contexts by abandoning the unnatural
features of complete contracts, common in the industrial organization literature,
and of monopolistic product markets, common in the gift-exchange literature.
However, there are other rather relevant aspects we left out. For instance, in our
experiments, we limit each employer to hire at most one worker. Clearly, most
labor relationships involve more workers per employer. It remains to be seen
whether our findings can be generalized to this more realistic context, where
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also horizontal fairness considerations might play a role. Would reciprocity
survive if competition leads to an unequal increase or decrease in wages across
workers? Or if some workers are laid off? In this sense, our studies pave the
way for more research on the interaction of labor market gift-exchange and
output market competition. Adding complexity in a systematic way will allow
for a clearer identification of patterns of behavior, which in turn will permit to
accurately inform public policy and help designing effective reforms.
Human cooperation has been praised as beneficial in numerous settings. For
instance, cooperation in teams boosts team performance; international cooper-
ation helps curb environmental degradation, or further scientific research. In
many cases, cooperation requires some prior (coordination on) investments.
Working efficiently on an interdisciplinary project, for instance, might require
researchers to get familiar with each others’ methods or literature. Long-term
employment relationships are often facilitated by investments, such as retire-
ment programs. Chapter 5 captures this aspect, and shows that those individ-
uals who invest, and manage to coordinate on relatively high investments, are
those who cooperate more. It also shows, however, that most individuals do
not invest or choose low investments. This suggests that investments can be an
important tool to enforce cooperation, but one cannot solely rely on voluntary
investments.
This result has important policy implications. For instance, discussions on
how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have recently moved their focus from
emission limits to investments in green technologies. Setting investment levels
is argued to be more effective at inducing compliance to environmental agree-
ments, since investments reduce the incentive to deviate and make cooperation
credible. Our results provide support for the introduction of this kind of poli-
cies. The “2020 Climate and Energy package” adopted by the European Union
seems to go in this direction: the agreement requires countries to set emis-
sion targets, and, at the same time, to develop renewable energy sources. Our
results might be also informative to competition policy. While mergers and
acquisitions are thoroughly scrutinized, governments usually encourage firms
cooperative investments, especially in R&D, because of the potential benefits
resulting, for instance, from spillover effects or cost reduction. However, our
results suggest that investments might facilitate collusion in the product mar-
ket. Therefore, authorities should evaluate firms’ co-investments with attention,
and investigate the possibility of price collusion in presence of relatively high
investments.
172
